Abstract Digital signatures are often used by trusted authorities to make unique bindings between a subject and a digital object; for example, certificate authorities certify a public key belongs to a domain name, and time-stamping authorities certify that a certain piece of information existed at a certain time. Traditional digital signature schemes however impose no uniqueness conditions, so a trusted authority could make multiple certifications for the same subject but different objects, be it intentionally, by accident, or following a (legal or illegal) coercion. We propose the notion of a double-authentication-preventing signature, in which a value to be signed is split into two parts: a subject and a message. If a signer ever signs two different messages for the same subject, enough information is revealed to allow anyone to compute valid signatures on behalf of the signer. This double-signature forgeability property discourages signers from misbehaving-a form of self-enforcement-and would give binding authorities like CAs some cryptographic arguments to resist legal coercion. We give a generic construction using a new type of trapdoor functions with extractability properties, which we show can be instantiated using the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer; we show an additional application of these new extractable trapdoor functions to standard digital signatures.
Introduction
Digital signatures are used in several contexts by authorities who are trusted to behave appropriately. For instance, certificate authorities (CAs) in public key infrastructures, who assert that a certain public key belongs to a party with a certain identifier, are trusted to not issue fraudulent certificates for a domain name; time-stamping services, who assert that certain information existed at a certain point in time, are trusted to not retroactively certify information (they should not "change the past").
In both of these cases, the authority is trusted to make a unique binding between a subject-a domain name or timeand a digital object-a public key or piece of information. However, traditional digital signatures provide no assurance of the uniqueness of this binding. As a result, an authority could make multiple bindings per subject.
Multiple bindings per subject can happen due to several reasons: poor management practices, a security breach, or coercion by external parties. Although there have been a few highly publicized certificate authority failures due to either poor management practices or security breaches, the vast majority of certificate authorities seem to successfully apply technological measures-including audited key generation ceremonies, secret sharing of signing keys, and use of hardware security modules-to securely and correctly carry out their role.
However, CAs have few tools to resist coercion, especially in the form of legal demands from governments. This was identified by Soghoian and Stamm [40] as the compelled certificate creation attack. For example, a certificate authority may receive a national security letter compelling it to assist in an investigation by issuing a second certificate for a specified domain name but containing the public key of the government agency, allowing the agency to impersonate Internet services to the target of the investigation. Regardless of one's opinions on the merits of these legal actions, they are a violation of the trust promised by certificate authorities: to never issue a certificate to anyone but the correct party. The extent to which legal coercion of CAs occurs is unknown; however, there are indications that the technique is of interest to governments. A networking device company named Packet Forensics sells a device for eavesdropping on encrypted web traffic in which, reportedly, "users have the ability to import a copy of any legitimate key they obtain (potentially by court order)". 1 Moreover, various documents released by NSA contractor Edward Snowden in disclosures in June-September 2013 indicate government interest in executing man-in-the-middle attacks on SSL users. 2 Two certificates for the same domain signed by a single CA indeed constitute a cryptographic proof of fraud. However, in practice, it is currently up to the "market" to decide how to respond: the nature of the response depends on the scope and nature of the infraction and the CA's handling of the issue. The consequences that have been observed from real-world CA incidents range from minimal, such as the CA revoking the extra certificates amid a period of bad publicity (as in the 2011 Comodo incident 3 ), up to the ultimate punishment for a CA on the web: removal of its root certificate from web browsers' lists of trusted CAs (as in the 2011 DigiNotar incident [20] , which was found to have issued fraudulent certificates that were used against Iranian Internet users [23] , and which lead to the bankruptcy of DigiNotar).
For a CA making business decisions on management and security practices, such consequences may be enough to convince the CA to invest in better systems. For a CA trying to resist a lawful order compelling it to issue a fraudulent certificate, however, such consequences may not be enough to convince a judge that the CA should not be compelled to violate the fundamental duty with which it was entrusted.
Contributions
We propose a new type of digital signature scheme for which the consequences of certain signer behaviours are unam- biguous: any double signing, for any reason, leads to an immediate, irreversible, incontrovertible loss of confidence in the signature system. On the one hand, this "fragility" provides no room for mistakes but, on the other hand, encourages "self-enforcement" of correct behaviour and allows a signer to make a more compelling argument resisting lawful coercion. If a CA fulfils a request to issue a double signature even to a lawful agency, the agency, by using the certificate, enables the attacked party to issue arbitrary certificates as well.
In a double-authentication-preventing signature (DAPS), the data to be signed are split into two parts: a subject and a message. If a signer ever signs two messages for the same subject, then enough information is revealed for anyone to be able to forge signatures on arbitrary messages, rendering the signer immediately and irrevocably untrustworthy. Depending on the nature of the subjects, in some applications an honest signer may need to track the list of subjects signed to avoid signing the same subject twice.
In addition to unforgeability, we require one of two new security properties for DAPS: double-signature forgeability, where a signer who signs two messages for the same subject reveals enough information for anyone to sign arbitrary messages, and a stronger notion called double-signature extractability, where two signatures on the same subject allow full recovery of the signing key.
We give a generic construction for DAPS based on a new primitive called extractable two-to-one trapdoor function which allows anyone, given two preimages of the same value, to recover the trapdoor required for inverting the function. We show how to construct these functions using the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer (RSA modulus), an algebraic reformulation of a mathematical construction that has been used in several cryptographic primitives. The resulting double-authentication-preventing signature scheme is efficient; with 1024-bit signing and verification keys, the signature size is about 20 KiB, and the runtime of our implementation using libgcrypt is about 0.3 s for signing and 0.1 s for verifying. Note that in applications such as PKI, signing happens rarely, and verifications may be cached.
Our quadratic residue-based construction provides double-signature extractability in what we call the trusted set-up model, where it is assumed that the signer follows the correct procedure for key generation. This model is suitable for scenarios where signers want to be honest and create their keys with best intention-and we hope most CAs belong to this group, facing coercive requests only after they have completed set-up. Our construction can be translated to the untrusted set-up model, where parties do not have to trust the signer to generate keys following the scheme specification, using zero-knowledge techniques for proving well-formedness of the verification key.
We also show how to use extractable two-to-one trapdoor functions to construct tightly secure standard digital signatures, demonstrating the utility of extractable two-toone trapdoor functions beyond our immediate application of DAPS.
Outline
We recall some notation and standard definitions in Sect. 2. We define a double-authentication-preventing signature in Sect. 3 and its unforgeability as well as double-signature forgeability and double-signature extractability properties. We introduce in Sect. 4 extractable 2:1 trapdoor functions, and as a warm-up we show in Sect. 5 how to construct a tightly secure standard digital signature scheme. We provide a factoring-based instantiation of extractable 2:1 trapdoor functions in Sect. 6 using sign-agnostic quadratic residues. In Sect. 7, we generically construct a DAPS scheme from extractable 2:1 trapdoor functions and prove the scheme's security and double-signature extractability in the trusted set-up model, as well as discuss its use with untrusted setup. Sect. 8 examines applications of DAPS to certification and time-stamping authorities. We conclude in Sect. 9. The appendices contain a review of basic results from number theory ("Appendix 1"), a construction of a random oracle that maps into the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues ("Appendix 2"), and proofs of results from the main body ("Appendix 3").
Related work
Certificate auditing and other techniques. Mechanisms such as Certificate Transparency 4 and others aim to identify malicious or incorrect CA behaviour by collecting and auditing public certificates. Incorrect behaviour, such as a CA issuing two certificates for the same domain name, can be identified and then presented as evidence possibly leading to a loss of trust. DAPS differs in that it provides an immediate and irrevocable loss of confidence and, importantly, provides a completely non-interactive solution. Recently, several distinct technical measures [19, 26, 35] have been proposed to try to wrest some trust decisions away from CAs, for example by allowing websites to make assertions to users about what certificates to accept in the future.
Self-enforcement and traitor tracing. Dwork et al. [18] introduced the notion of self-enforcement in cryptography, in which the cryptosystem is designed to force the user to keep the functionality private, that is, to not delegate or transfer the functionality to another user. There are a variety of techniques for ensuring self-enforcement: trade-offs in efficiency [18] or by allowing recovering of some associated secret value with any delegated version of the secret information [13, 28, 31] . Broadcast encryption schemes often aim for a related notion, traitor tracing [12] , in which the broadcaster aims to detect which of several receivers have used their private key to construct and distribute a pirate device; typically, the broadcaster can identify which private key was leaked. DAPS differs from this line of research in that it does not aim to deter delegation or transferring of keys; rather it aims to deter a single party from performing a certain local operation (double signing).
Accountable IBE. Goyal [24] aimed to reduce trust in the key generation centre (KGC) in identity-based encryption:
How can a user demonstrate that the KGC created a second key for the user's identity? In accountable IBE, the key generation protocol between the user and the KGC results in one of a large number of possible keys being generated, and which one is generated is unknown to the KGC. Thus if the KGC issues a second key, it will with high probability be different, and the two different keys for the same identity serve as a proof that the KGC misbehaved. This effectively allows IBE to achieve the same level of detection as normal public key infrastructures: two certificates for the same subject serve as a proof that the CA misbehaved. However, neither approach has the stronger level of deterrence offered by DAPS: double signing leads to an immediate and irrevocable loss of confidence, rather than just proof of misbehaving for consideration of prosecution.
Digital cash. Digital cash schemes [11] often aim to detect double-spending: a party who uses a token once maintains anonymity, but a party who uses a token twice reveals enough information for her identity to be recovered and traced. DAPS has some conceptual similarities, in that a party who signs two messages with the same subject reveals enough information for her secret key to be recovered. In both settings, double operations leak information, but double-spending in digital cash typically leaks only an identity, whereas double signing in DAPS leaks the signer's private key. It is interesting to note that the number-theoretic structures our DAPS scheme builds on are similar to those used in early digital cash to provide double-spending traceability [11] : both schemes use RSA moduli that can be factored if signers/spenders misbehave. However, there does not seem to be a direct connection between the primitives.
One-time signatures. One-time signatures, first proposed by Lamport using a construction based on hash functions [32] , allow at most one message to be signed. Many instances can be combined using Merkle trees [33] to allow multiple signatures with just a single verification key, but key generation time becomes a function of the total number of signatures allowed. Double-authentication-preventing signatures are fundamentally different from one-time signatures: in DAPS, the number of messages to be signed need not be fixed a pri-ori, and our construction relies on number-theoretic trapdoor functions, rather than solely hash functions. A natural first attempt at creating a DAPS scheme is to begin with a Merkletree construction, in which each subject identifies a path from the root to a leaf and hence which keys must be used to sign the message. However, this requires a key generation time at least linear in the size of the subject space and therefore limits the size of the latter. Moreover, in such a scheme two signatures under the same subject do not immediately lead to the ability to forge signatures on arbitrary messages. Our scheme allows for arbitrary subject spaces and has efficient key generation time, so we leave the construction of a treebased DAPS as an open problem.
Fail-stop signatures. Fail-stop signatures considered in [7, 38, [43] [44] [45] allow a signer to prove to a judge that a forgery has occurred; a signer is protected against cryptanalytic attacks by even an unbounded adversary. Verifiers too are protected against computationally bounded signers who try to claim a signature is a forgery when it is not. When a forgery is detected, generally the security of the scheme collapses, because some secret information can be recovered, and so the security of previous signatures is left in doubt. Forgery-resilient signatures [34] aim to have similar properties to fail-stop signatures-the ability for a signer to prove a cryptanalytic forgery-but discovery of a forgery does not immediately render previous signatures insecure. Both failstop and forgery-resilient signatures focus on the ability of an honest signer to prove someone else has constructed a forgery, whereas DAPS is about what happens when a dishonest or coerced signer signs two messages for the same subject.
Chameleon hash functions. Chameleon hash functions [30] are trapdoor-based and randomized. Hashing is collision resistant as long as only the public parameters are known. However, given the trapdoor and the message-randomness pair used to create a specific hash value, a collision for that value can be efficiently found. Some constructions allow the extraction of the trapdoor from any collision [1, 10, 41] . However, it remains open how DAPS could be constructed from Chameleon hash functions.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some notation and recall some standard cryptographic definitions.
Notation. If S is a finite set, let U (S) denote the uniform distribution on S and x ← R S denote sampling x uniformly from S. If A and B are two probability distributions, then notation A ≈ B denotes that the statistical distance between A and B is negligible. If A is a (probabilistic) algorithm, then x ← R A O (y) denotes running A with input y on uniformly random coins with oracle access to O, and setting x to be the output. For a given x, we write A O (y) ⇒ x for the event that
A outputs x. We use the notation A(y; r ) to explicitly identify the random coins r on which the otherwise deterministic algorithm A is run. 
Definition 1 (Pseudorandom function)
If -KGen(1 λ ): On input security parameter 1 λ , this algorithm outputs a signing key sk and a verification key vk. -Sign(sk, subj, msg): On input signing key sk and subject/message pair subj, msg ∈ {0, 1} * , this algorithm outputs a signature σ . -Ver(vk, subj, msg, σ ): On input verification key vk, subject/message pair subj, msg ∈ {0, 1} * , and candidate signature σ , this algorithm outputs either 0 or 1.
Definition 6 (Correctness)
A double-authenticationpreventing signature scheme is correct if, for all λ ∈ N, for all key pairs (sk, vk) ← R KGen(1 λ ), for all subj, msg ∈ {0, 1} * , and for all signatures σ ← R Sign(sk, subj, msg), we have Ver(vk, subj, msg, σ ) = 1.
Unforgeability
Our unforgeability notion largely coincides with the standard unforgeability notion for digital signature schemes [22] ; the main difference is that, for DAPS, forgeries crafted by the adversary are not considered valid if the adversary has requested forgeries on different messages for the same subject.
Definition 7 (Existential unforgeability)
A doubleauthentication-preventing signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks if, for all efficient adversaries A, the success probability Fig. 2 is a negligible function in λ.
Double-signature forgeability
Although Definition 7 ensures that signatures of DAPS are generally unforgeable, we do want signatures to be forgeable in certain circumstances, namely when two different messages have been signed for the same subject. First, we define the notion of compromising pairs of signatures, which says when two signatures should lead to a forgery, and then define double-signature forgeability. 
We now define the double-signature forgeability requirement. Here, the adversary takes the role of a malicious signer that aims to generate compromising pairs of signatures that do not lead to successful double-signature forgeries. We consider two scenarios: the trusted set-up model, where key generation is assumed to proceed honestly, and the untrusted set-up model, where the adversary has full control over key generation as well.
Definition 9 (Double-signature forgeability) A doubleauthentication-preventing signature DAPS is doublesignature forgeable (resp. double-signature forgeable with trusted set-up) if an efficient algorithm
, and subject/message pair subj * , msg * ∈ {0, 1} * , this algorithm outputs a sig-
is known such that, for all efficient adversaries A, the prob-
of success in the DSF (resp. DSF * ) experiment of Fig. 3 is a negligible function in λ.
Double-signature extractability
While the notion of double-signature forgeability expresses the desired functionality of the scheme from a theoretical
Return 1 iff all the following hold: point of view, from an engineering perspective it may be more natural to consider double-signature extractability, in which two signatures for the same subject lead to full recovery of the signing key; obviously, full recovery of the signing key gives the ability to forge. is known such that, for all efficient adversaries A, the prob-
of success in the DSE (resp. DSE * ) experiment of Fig. 4 is a negligible function in λ.
-sk is not the signing key corresponding to vk
4 Return 1 iff all the following hold: Note that the DSE experiment assumes existence of an efficient predicate that verifies that a candidate sk is the signing key corresponding to a verification key. In some schemes, there may be several signing keys that correspond to a verification key or it may be inefficient to check. However, for the scheme presented in Sect. 7, when instantiated with the factoring-based primitive of Sect. 6, it is easy to check that a signing key ( p, q) corresponds to a verification key n; note that there is a canonical representation of such signing keys (take p < q).
Clearly, double-signature extractability implies doublesignature forgeability. In fact, DSE implies that the forger can generate signatures that are perfectly indistinguishable from signatures generated by the honest signer. This is an important feature that plain double-signature forgeable schemes do not necessarily offer, and indeed one can construct degenerate examples of schemes that are double-signature forgeable but for which forged signatures are obviously different from honest signatures.
2:1 Trapdoor functions and extractability
We introduce the concept of 2:1 trapdoor functions (2:1-TDF). At a high level, such functions are trapdoor one-way functions, meaning that they should be hard to invert except with knowledge of a trapdoor. They are two-to-one, meaning that the domain is exactly twice the size of the range, and every element of the range has precisely two preimages. We also describe an additional property, extractability, which means that given two distinct preimages of an element of the range, the trapdoor can be computed.
Consider two finite sets, A and B, such that A has twice the size of B. Let f : A → B be a surjective function such that, for any element b ∈ B, there are exactly two preimages in A; f is not injective, so the inverse function does not exist. Define instead f −1 : B × {0, 1} → A such that for each b ∈ B the two preimages under f are given by f −1 (b, 0) and f −1 (b, 1). Observe that this effectively partitions set A into two subsets A 0 = f −1 (B, 0) and
Function f is a 2:1-TDF if the following additional properties hold: sets A 0 , A 1 , and B are efficiently samplable, function f is efficiently computable, and inverse function f −1 is hard to compute unless some specific trapdoor information is known. We finally require an extraction capability: there should be an efficient way to recover the trapdoor for the computation of f −1 from any two elements a 0 = a 1 with f (a 0 ) = f (a 1 ) (we will also write a 0 x ∼ a 1 for such configurations). The setting of 2:1-TDFs is illustrated in Fig. 5 . We will formalize the functionality and security properties below. 
Definition
We give a formal definition of 2:1-TDF and its correctness and establish afterwards that it implements the intuition developed above. -TdGen(1 λ ): On input security parameter 1 λ , this randomized algorithm outputs a pair (td, pub), where td is a trapdoor and pub is some associated public information. Each possible outcome pub implicitly defines finite sets A = A(pub) and B = B(pub). -Sample A (pub, d; r ): On input public information pub, bit d ∈ {0, 1}, and randomness r ∈ {0, 1} λ , this algorithm outputs a value a ∈ A(pub). As shortcuts:
-Sample B (pub; r ): On input public information pub and randomness r ∈ {0, 1} λ , this algorithm outputs a value b ∈ B(pub). -Apply(pub, a): On input public information pub and element a ∈ A(pub), this deterministic algorithm outputs an element b ∈ B(pub).
On input trapdoor td, element b ∈ B(pub), and bit d ∈ {0, 1}, this deterministic algorithm outputs an element a ∈ A(pub). -Decide(pub, a): On input public information pub and element a ∈ A(pub), this deterministic algorithm outputs a bit d ∈ {0, 1}.
, and all b ∈ B(pub), we have that
We further require Decide(pub, Sample A (pub, d; r )) = d for all d ∈ {0, 1} and r ∈ {0, 1} λ .
Let (td, pub) be output by TdGen. Consider partition (1), and injective by condition (2) . Hence, we have bijections ψ 0 :
Define now relation
Note that for each a ∈ A(pub), there exists exactly one
Observe how algorithms Apply and Reverse correspond to functions f : A → B and f −1 : B × {0, 1} → A discussed at the beginning of Sect. 4.
Security notions
We proceed with the specification of the principal security properties of 2:1-TDFs, samplability and one-wayness. The treatment of extraction follows in the next section. The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 appear in "Proofs from Section 4" of Appendix 3.
Samplability
The task of a 2:1-TDF's Sample A and Sample B algorithms is to provide samples from sets A(pub) and B(pub), respectively, that are distributed nearly uniformly. The samplability security property refers to the extent to which these samples are close to uniform.
Definition 13 (Sampling distance) Let X be a 2:1-TDF and S 0 , S 1 be (sampling) algorithms. We define the sampling distance of S 0 , S 1 with respect to a distinguisher D as Dist
We consider different strategies to obtain samples from set B: using the Sample B algorithm directly, or using 
In Lemma 1, the terms on the left-hand side are small if the terms on the right-hand side are. This observation motivates the following security requirement on 2:1-TDFs. Note that if Dist
is negligible, then so are
and Dist
Definition 15 (Samplability of 2:1-TDF) Let X denote a 2:1-TDF. We say that X is samplable if, for all efficient distinguishers D, D , we have that Dist 
One-wayness
We next define one-wayness for 2:1-TDFs. Intuitively, it should be infeasible to find preimages and second preimages of the Apply algorithm without knowing the corresponding trapdoor. The following simple lemma shows that second preimage resistance implies preimage resistance. We will see in Sect. 4.3 that these notions are actually equivalent for an extractable variant of 2:1-TDF. 
Definition 16 (Preimage resistance of 2:1-TDF) A 2:1-TDF X is preimage resistant and second preimage resistant if Succ
INV−1 X,A (λ) := Pr[Exp INV−1 X,A (λ) = 1] and Succ INV−2 X,B (λ) := Pr[Exp INV−2 X,B (λ) = 1] are negligible Exp INV-1 X,A (λ): 1 (td, pub) ← R TdGen(1 λ ) 2 b ← R Sample B (pub) 3 a ← R A(pub, b) 4 Return 1 iff Apply(pub, a) = b Exp INV-2 X,B (λ): 1 (td, pub) ← R TdGen(1 λ ) 2 a ← R Sample A (pub) 3 a ← R B(pub, a) 4 Return 1 iff a x ∼ a
Extractable 2:1 trapdoor functions
We extend the functionality of 2:1-TDFs to include extraction of the trapdoor: knowledge of any two elements a 0 , a 1 ∈ A with a 0 = a 1 ∧ f (a 0 ) = f (a 1 ) shall immediately reveal the system's inversion trapdoor. is known such that we have Extract(pub, a, a ) = td for all (td, pub) output by TdGen and all a, a ∈ A(pub) with a 
Tightly secure signatures from 2:1 trapdoor functions
As a first application of our new primitive, we present a signature scheme. The construction essentially extends the well-known full-domain hash paradigm (FDH, see [8] ) from bijective trapdoor functions, e.g. TDPs, to the new 2:1-TDF notion. While security reductions of regular FDH signatures are necessarily highly untight (the security loss in comparison with TDP security is q H , the number of adversary's hash function evaluations; but see [15] for tighter bounds for homomorphic TDPs), it turns out that our new signature scheme is tightly secure if the deployed 2:1-TDF is extractable. We note that our construction is similar in spirit with the tightly secure signature constructions found in [4, 21] ; however, our abstraction model is quite different. Fig. 7 .
Construction 1 (Signatures
We assess the security of 2 : 1−Sig in Theorem 1; the corresponding proof appears in "Proofs from Section 5" of Appendix. A factor of q H appears in the bounds claimed in Theorem 1. That factor scales a purely statistical quantity that can easily be forced to be smaller than (say) 2 −256 , and this matches the notion of "tightness" in works like [4] (in which the sampling issues that we factor in are actually left implicit). 
Constructing extractable 2:1 trapdoor functions
Having introduced 2:1-TDFs and extractable 2:1-TDFs, we now show how to construct these primitives: we propose an efficient extractable 2:1-TDF and prove it secure, assuming hardness of the integer factorization problem.
Our construction builds on the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues, a specific structure from number theory. This group was introduced to cryptography by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest in [22] , and rediscovered 20 years later by Hofheinz and Kiltz [25] . We first reproduce the results of [22, 25] and then extend them towards our requirements. 5 In our exposition, we assume that the reader is familiar with definition and structure of groups Z × n , J n , and Q R n , for Blum integers n. If we additionally define J n = Z × n \ J n and Q R n = J n \ Q R n , these five sets are related to each other as visualized in Fig. 8 (left) . Also illustrated is the action of the squaring operation: it is 4:1 from Z × n to Q R n , 2:1 from J n to Q R n , and 1:1 (i.e. bijective) from Q R n to Q R n . For reference, we reproduce all number-theoretic details relevant to this paper in Facts 1-6 and Corollary 2, in "Appendix 1".
Sign-agnostic quadratic residues
For an RSA modulus n, it is widely believed that efficiently distinguishing elements in Q R n from elements in Q R n is a hard problem. It also seems to be infeasible to sample elements from Q R n without knowing a square root of the samples, or to construct hash functions that map to Q R n and could be modelled as random oracles. However, such properties are a prerequisite in certain applications in cryptography [25] , what renders group Q R n unsuitable for such cases. As we see next, by switching from the group of quadratic residues modulo n to the related group of signagnostic quadratic residues modulo n, sampling and hashing become feasible.
The use of sign-agnostic quadratic residues in cryptography is explicitly proposed in [22, 25] . However, some aspects of the algebraical structure of this group are concealed in both works by the fact that the group operation is defined to act directly on specific representations of elements. The introduction to sign-agnostic quadratic residues that we give in the following paragraphs uses a new and more consistent notation that aims at making the algebraical structure more readily apparent. Using this new notation, it will not be difficult to establish Lemmas 5-8 below.
Let (H, ·) be an arbitrary finite abelian group that contains an element T ∈ H \ {1} such that Fig. 8 (right) . After agreeing on notations {±x} = {x, −x} and {±x} 2 = {±(x 2 )}, we additionally obtain the following result (proven in "Proofs from Section 6" of Appendix 3):
Lemma 4 Let n be a Blum integer. Then Q R n
Moreover, by exploiting identity Q R n / ±1 = J n / ±1 , we directly get the following characterizations of Q R n / ±1 and Q R n / ±1 . Observe that the sets are well-defined since Fig. 8 Illustration of Z × n and Z × n / ±1 (for Blum integers n), and subgroups Q R n , J n , and J n / ±1 = Q R n / ±1 . Also visualized is the action of the squaring operation (see Corollaries 1 and 2)
Many facts on the structure of Z × n can be lifted to Z × n / ±1 . This holds in particular for Lemmas 5 and 6, which directly correspond with Facts 4 and 5 from "Appendix 1". Similarly, Corollaries 1 and 2 correspond. We stress that the following results do not appear in [22, 25] ; the corresponding proofs appear in "Proofs from Section 6" of Appendix 3.
Lemma 5 (Square roots in Z ×
n / ±1 ) If n is a Blum integer, every element {±y} ∈ Q R n / ±1 has exactly two square roots in Z × n / ±1 . More precisely, there exist unique {±x 0 } ∈ Q R n / ±1 and {±x 1 } ∈ Q R n / ±1 such that {±x 0 } 2 = {±y} = {±x 1 } 2 . The factorization of n can readily be recovered from such pairs {±x 0 }, {±x 1 }: non-trivial divisors of n are given by gcd(n, x 0 −x 1 ) and gcd(n, x 0 +x 1 ). Square roots in Z × n / ±1 can be efficiently computed if the factors of n = pq are known.
Corollary 1 (Squaring in
Z × n / ±1 , Q R n / ±1 , Q R n / ±1 ) If n
is a Blum integer, the squaring operation Z ×
n / ±1 → Q R n / ±1 : {±x} → {±x} 2 is a 2:1 mapping. Moreover, squaring is a 1:1 function from Q R n / ±1 to Q R n / ±1 and from Q R n / ±1 to Q R n / ±1 . These relations are illustrated in Fig. 8 (right) .
Lemma 6 (Computing square roots in Z ×
n / ±1 is hard) Let n be a Blum integer. Computing square roots in Z × n / ±1 is as hard as factoring n. 
Lemma 7 (Samplability and decidability) Let n be a Blum integer and t ∈ Z
Remark 1 (Representation of elements) An efficient and compact way to represent elements {±x} ∈ Z × n / ±1 is by the binary encoding of x = min{x, n − x} ∈ [1, (n − 1)/2], as proposed by [22] . The corresponding decoding procedure is x → {x, −x}.
Construction of Blum-2:1-TDF from sign-agnostic quadratic residues
We use the tools from Sect. 6.1 to construct a factoring-based extractable 2:1-TDF, which will map Z × n / ±1 → Q R n / ±1 . While the Apply algorithm corresponds to the squaring operation, extractability will be possible given distinct square roots of an element.
Construction 2 (Blum-2:1-TDF)
Define algorithms These algorithms are all efficient. Correctness of Blum-2:1-TDF and the various security properties follow straightforwardly from the number-theoretic facts established in Sect. 6.1. The proof appears in "Proofs from Section 6" of Appendix 3. Fig. 9 .
The basic idea of the signing algorithm is as follows. From any given subject, the signer derives message-independent signing elements b 1 , . . . , b λ h ∈ B. The signer also hashes subject and message to a bit string d 1 . . . d λ h ; for each bit d i , she finds the preimage a i of the signing element b i which is in the d i partition of A, either in A 0 or in A 1 . The signature σ is basically the vector of these preimages. Intuitively, the scheme is unforgeable because it is hard to find preimages of signing elements b i without knowing the trapdoor. Moreover, the scheme is extractable because the signing elements b i are only dependent on the subject, so the signatures of two different messages for the same subject use the same b i . But, assuming collision resistance of H # , at least one different d i is used in the two signatures, so two distinct preimages of b i are involved, which allows anyone to recover the trapdoor.
We give further explanation on the subject-dependent value s that we embed into every signature. Consider the standard security reduction for proving FDH-TDP signatures unforgeable [9] , and in particular how adversary's queries to random oracle H are answered. Usually, random oracle H is programmed such that H (m) = g(x), where m is
Sign(sk, subj, msg) : s, a 1 , . . . , a λ h ) Ver(vk, subj, msg, σ) :
If Apply(pub, a i ) = H pub (subj, s, i), return 0 7
If Decide(pub, a i ) = d i , return 0 8 Return 1 Fig. 9 Double-authentication-preventing signature scheme 2 : 1−DAPS the queried message, g is the TDP, and x is sampled uniformly from the domain of g. This construction exploits that g (as opposed to g −1 ) can be efficiently computed without knowledge of any trapdoor, and it ensures that the simulation 'knows' the preimage of hash values H (m), for all messages m. When switching to 2:1-TDFs, however, we observe that this method of reduction does not work satisfyingly: While for any H query a corresponding preimage a ∈ A of the 2:1-TDF could be uniformly sampled, it might be related value a ∈ A, a x ∼ a , that needs to be revealed in later queries to the signing oracle. But computing a from a, or even jointly sampling them, is infeasible without knowledge of 2:1-TDF's trapdoor. In our DAPS construction, value s ensures that the simulation is not required to program H pub oracle until the point where it learns subj and msg, i.e. learns which preimage it will have to reveal. For further details, we refer to the proof of Theorem 3.
Unforgeability of 2 : 1−DAPS
We next establish existential unforgeability of 2 : 1−DAPS (cf. Definition 7). The proof proceeds by changing the EUF simulation so that it performs all operations without using the signing key and without (noticeably) changing the distribution of verification key and answers to A's oracle queries; these changes cannot be detected if 2:1-TDF X is samplable. From any forgery crafted by adversary A, either a preimage or second preimage of X , or a collision of H # can be extracted. Observe that, by Lemma 2, it suffices to require second preimage resistance of X in Theorem 3. The detailed proof appears in "Proof of unforgeability (Theorem 3)" of Appendix 3. Remark 3 (2 : 1−DAPS is deterministic and S−EUF) Note that 2 : 1−DAPS is not only deterministic but also unique [15] and, in particular, strongly unforgeable.
Double-signature extractability of 2 : 1−DAPS
Assuming collision resistance of H # , two signatures for different messages but the same subject result in some index i where the hashes H # (subj, s, msg 1 ) and H # (subj, s, msg 2 ) differ. The corresponding ith values a i in the two signatures can be used to extract the signing key. This is the intuition behind Theorem 4; the detailed proof appears in "Proof of double-signature extractability (Theorem 4)" of Appendix 3. 
Sign(sk, subj, msg) :
= y using factors (p, q) of n and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
of n and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
If a In algorithm Ver, for any elementx = {±x} ∈ Z × n / ±1 we write x n as shortcut for
Observe that the double-signature extractability of 2 : 1−DAPS in Theorem 4 relies on the assumption that signer's verification key is well-formed. When instantiated with Blum-2:1-TDF (see Sect. 7.3), this means assuming that signer's public information n is a Blum integer, as extractability of Blum-2:1-TDF is guaranteed only in this case. Well-formedness can be shown using interactive or noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs. In particular, there is an interactive zero-knowledge protocol of van de Graaf and Peralta [42] for demonstrating that an integer n is of the form p r q s where p and q are both primes such that p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, which can be combined with the interactive protocol of Boyar et al. [6] for demonstrating that an integer n is square free, to ultimately show that a modulus n is a Blum integer. Alternatively, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for the well-formedness of a Blum integer was given by De Santis et al. [16] and for products of safe primes (which includes Blum integers) by Camenisch and Michels [14] . Figure 10 shows the instantiation of 2 : 1−DAPS from Fig. 9 using the Blum-2:1-TDF from Construction 2. In Table 1 , we analyse the corresponding sizes of verification keys, signing keys, and signatures, and the cost of signature generation and verification, with abstract results as well as results with 1024-and 2048-bit keys. We assume the element representation from Remark 1 and the verification key optimization from Remark 2.
DAPS instantiation based on sign-agnostic quadratic residues
We also report the results of our implementation of DAPS using the libgcrypt cryptographic library. 6 As libgcrypt does not have routines for square roots or Jacobi symbols, we implemented our own, and we expect that there may be space for improvement with optimized implementations of these Signature verification cost (2λ h + 2) · Jac, (λ h + 1) · sqr 0.105 s 0.276 s Jac: computation of Jacobi symbol modulo n; sqrt: square root modulo n; sqr: squaring modulo n operations. Timings reported are an average of 50 iterations, performed on a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 (3720QM) CPU, using libgcrypt 1.5.2, compiled in x86_64 mode using LLVM 3.3 and compiler flag -O3. Source code for our implementation is available online at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/73005/. With 1024-bit signing and verification keys, a signature is about 20 KiB in size and takes about 0.341 s to generate and 0.105 s to verify. While our scheme is less efficient than a regular signature scheme, we believe these timings are still in the acceptable range; this holds in particular if our scheme is used to implement CA functionality where signature generation happens rarely and verification results can be cached.
Applications
DAPS allows applications that employ digital signatures for establishing unique bindings between digital objects to provide self-enforcement for correct signer behaviour, and resistance by signers to coercion or the "compelled certificate creation attack" [40] . Whenever the verifier places high value on the uniqueness of the binding, it may be worthwhile to employ DAPS instead of traditional digital signatures, despite the potential for increased damage in the case of accidental errors by the signer.
It should be noted that use of DAPS may impose an additional burden on honest signers: they need to maintain a list of previously signed subjects to avoid double signing. Some signers may already do so, but the importance of the correctness of this list is increased with DAPS. As noted below, signers may wish to use additional protections to maintain their list of signed subjects, for example by cryptographically authenticating it using a message authentication code with a key in the same hardware security module as the main signing key.
In this section, we examine a few cryptographic applications involving unique bindings and discuss the potential applicability of DAPS.
Certificate authorities
The potential use of DAPS for certificate authorities has been discussed in some detail in the Introduction.
DAPS could be used to ensure that certification authorities in the web PKI behave as expected. For example, by having the subject consist of the domain name and the year, and the message consist of the public key and other certificate details, a CA who signs one certificate for "www.example.com" using DAPS cannot sign another for the same domain and time period without invalidating its own key. A CA using DAPS must then be stateful, carefully keeping track of the previous subjects signed and refusing to sign duplicates. In commercial certificate authorities, where the signing is done on a hardware security module (HSM), the list of subjects signed should be kept under authenticated control of the HSM.
A DAPS-based PKI would need to adopt an appropriate convention on validity periods to accommodate expiry of certificates without permitting double-signing. For example, a DAPS PKI may use a subject with a low-granularity non-overlapping validity period ("www.example.com 2015") since high-granularity overlapping validity periods in the subject give a malicious CA a vector for issuing two certificates without signing the exact same subject twice ("www.example.com 20150501-20160430" versus "www.example.com 20150502-20160501").
Furthermore, a DAPS-based PKI could support revocation using standard mechanisms such as certificate revocation lists. Reissuing could be achieved by including a counter in the DAPS subject (e.g. "www.example.com 2015 0") and using DAPS-based revocation to provide an unambiguous and unalterable auditable chain from the initial certificate to the current one.
One of the major problems with multi-CA PKIs such as the web PKI is that clients trust many CAs, any one of which can issue a certificate for a particular subject. A DAPS-based PKI would prevent one CA from signing multiple certificates for a subject, but not other CAs from also signing certificates for that subject. We could consider a multi-CA PKI in which other DAPS-based CAs agree to issue a "void certificate" for a domain name when presented with a valid certificate from another CA, thereby disqualifying them from issuing future signatures on that subject. In general, though, coordination of CAs is challenging. We believe it remains a very interesting open question to find cryptographic constructions that solve the multi-CA PKI problem.
Time-stamping
A standard approach to preventing time-stamping authorities from "changing the past" is to require that, when a digital signature is constructed that asserts that certain pieces of information x exist at a particular time t, the actual message being signed must also include the (hash of) messages authenticated in the previous time periods. The authority is prevented from trying to change the past and assert that x = x existed at time t because the signatures issued at time periods t + 1, t + 2, . . . chain back to the original message x.
DAPS could be used to alternatively discourage timestamping authority fraud by having the subject consist of the time period t and the message consist of whatever information x is to be signed at that time period. A time-stamping authority who signs an assertion for a given time period using DAPS cannot sign another for the same time period without invalidating its own key. Assuming an honest authority's system is designed to only sign once per time period, the signer need not statefully track the list of all signed subjects, since time periods automatically increment.
Hybrid DAPS + standard signatures
DAPS could be combined with a standard signature scheme to provide more robustness in the case of an accidental error, but also provide a clear and quantifiable decrease in security due to a double signing, giving users a window of time in which to migrate away from the signer.
We can achieve this goal by augmenting a generic standard signature scheme with our factoring-based DAPS as follows. The signer publishes a public key consisting of the standard signature's verification key, the 2 : 1−DAPS verification key n, and a verifiable Rabin encryption under key n of, say, the first half of the bits of the standard scheme's signing key. The hybrid DAPS signature for a subject/message pair would consist of the standard scheme's signature on subject and message concatenated, and the DAPS signature on separated subject and message. If two messages are ever signed for the same subject, then the signer's DAPS secret key can be recovered, which can then be used to decrypt the Rabin ciphertext containing the first half of the standard scheme's signing key. This is not quite enough to readily forge signatures, but it substantially and quantifiably weakens trust in this signer's signatures, making it clear that migration to a new signer must occur but still providing a window of time in which to migrate. As the sketched combination of primitives exhibits non-standard dependencies between different secret keys, a thorough cryptographic analysis of the construction is indispensable.
Conclusions
We have introduced a new type of signatures, doubleauthentication-preventing signatures, in which a subject/ message pair is signed. In certain situations, DAPS can provide greater assurance to verifiers that signers behave honestly since there is a great disincentive for signers who misbehave: if a signer ever signs two different messages for the same subject, then enough information is revealed to allow anyone to forge arbitrary signatures or even fully recover the signer's secret key. Although this leads to less robustness in the face of accidental behaviour, it also provides a mechanism for self-enforcement of correct behaviour and gives trusted signers such as certificate authorities an argument to resist coercion and the compelled certificate creation attack.
Our construction is based on a new primitive called extractable 2:1 trapdoor function. We have shown how to instantiate this using an algebraic reformulation of signagnostic quadratic residues modulo Blum integers; the resulting DAPS is unforgeable assuming factoring is hard, with reasonable signature sizes and computation times.
We believe DAPS can be useful in scenarios where trusted authorities are meant to make unique bindings between identifiers and digital objects. This includes the cases of certificate authorities in PKIs who are supposed to make unique bindings between domain names and public keys, and time-stamping authorities who are supposed to make unique bindings between time periods and pieces of information.
Besides the practical applications of DAPS, several interesting theoretical questions arise from our work. Are there more efficient constructions of DAPS? How else can extractable 2:1 trapdoor functions be instantiated? Given that DAPS and double-spending-resistant digital cash use similar number-theoretic primitives, can DAPS be used to generically construct untraceable digital cash? Can these techniques be applied to key generation in the identity-based setting? Can DAPS be adapted to provide assurance in a multi-CA setting? . Although a n = 1 for all a ∈ Q R n , the Jacobi symbol does not serve as an indicator for Q R n : if n is a Blum integer, then −1 n = 1 and thus a n = −a n for all a ∈ Z × n , but fact a ∈ Q R n ⇒ −a / ∈ Q R n implies that at most one of a, a can be in Q R n . If n is a Blum integer such that p ≡ 3 mod 8 and q ≡ 7 mod 8, then 2 n = −1. The Jacobi symbol can be efficiently computed, even if the factorization of n is not known.
The set J n = a ∈ Z × n : a n = 1 is a subgroup of Z × n , and Q R n is a subgroup of J n . Define J n = Z × n \ J n and
, and |Q R n | = |Q R n | = ϕ(n)/4. These relations are illustrated in Fig. 8 (left). 
Corollary 2 (Squaring in Z ×
n , J n , and Q R n ) Let n be an RSA modulus. The squaring operation Z × n → Q R n : x → x 2 is a 4:1 mapping. If n is a Blum integer, then squaring is a 2:1 function from J n to Q R n , while squaring is a 1:1 function both from Q R n to Q R n and from Q R n to Q R n . These relations are illustrated in Fig. 8 (left) .
Fact 5 (Computing square roots in Z ×
n is hard) Let n be an RSA modulus. Computing square roots modulo n is as hard as factoring n. In particular, given an algorithm A that computes square roots of elements in Q R n , factors of n can be found by randomly picking x ← R Z × n and running x ← R A(n, x 2 ) to obtain a second, potentially different, square root of x 2 . With probability 1/2, x ≡ ±x; by Fact 4, a non-trivial factor of n is given by gcd(n, x − x ). Fact 6 (Samplability and decidability of Z n , Z × n , J n , J n ) Let n = pq be an RSA modulus, t ∈ Z × n a fixed element with t n = −1, and log n. Identify set {0, 1} with [0, 2 −1] using a canonical bijection and consider functions
A common method (see [17, 39] and [37, §B.5.1.3]) for sampling random elements x from Z n is to pick a seed r ← R {0, 1} and to output x = E(r ). The resulting distribution is statistically close to uniform [39] . If p and q grow exponentially in a security parameter, then |Z × n |/|Z n | = 1 − ( p + q − 1)/ pq becomes negligibly close to 1, so function E can be used without modification for sampling from Z × n with a distribution statistically close to uniform. Note that membership in Z × n can be efficiently decided since
Elements in J n and J n can be efficiently recognized by evaluating the Jacobi symbol. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that elements y can be uniformly sampled from J n by picking a random x ← R Z × n and outputting y = F(x). Elements from J n can be sampled in a similar fashion.
It is widely believed that, unless the factorization of n is known, distinguishing elements in Q R n from elements in Q R n is a hard problem. It also seems to be infeasible to sample elements from Q R n without knowing a square root of these samples.
Appendix 2: Indifferentiable hashing onto Q R n / ±1
Specific applications of the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer n, including our constructions in Sects. 5 and 7, might rely on the existence of a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Q R n / ±1 . Moreover, the corresponding security arguments might require modelling H as a random oracle, as in Theorem 3. We show in the following how to construct such hash functions onto Q R n / ±1 from a hash function onto bitstrings. Let log n be an integer and assume h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} is a hash function that may be modelled as a random oracle. From h, we construct H : {0,
are the functions specified by Fact 6 and (implicitly) by Lemma 7 (observe that E maps onto Z n , not onto Z × n as syntactically required for composing E with F; however, as described in Fact 6, operations involving elements from Z n are statistically indistinguishable from operations involving elements from Z × n ). This method of constructing hash functions follows Boneh and Franklin [5] and Brier et al. [2, 3] . Specifically, Brier et al. show that if function ϕ = G • F • E is an admissible encoding and h is a random oracle, then H = ϕ • h is indifferentiable from a random oracle [2, §3] . To program H , we can take a preimage of ϕ and program h accordingly. We reproduce the definition and main theorem from [2] as follows. [2] ) A function ϕ : S → R between finite sets is an admissible encoding if it satisfies the following properties:
Definition 18 (Admissible encoding
(1) Computable: ϕ is computable in deterministic polynomial time. As admissibility is a transitive property, it suffices to show that E, F, G are admissible encodings. Define corresponding inversion algorithms I E , I F , I G as
(and observe that I G is actually well-defined 
behaves like a random oracle by Theorem 5.
Appendix 3: Proofs
Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1
We only prove the first inequality; the remaining two follow analogously. Define the required distinguishers as
, where we assume implicit parameter 'pub'. After observing that Apply is 2:1 and hence we have that Dist
(λ) = 0 for any distinguisher D, the triangle inequality shows A(pub, b) 
Proof of Lemma
) = b. Inspection shows Dist Sample B ,Sample A B X,D B (λ) = Pr[(td, pub) ← R TdGen(1 λ ); b ← R Sample B (pub) : D B (pub, b) = 1] − Pr[(td, pub) ← R TdGen(1 λ ); b ← R Sample A B (pub) : D B (pub, b) = 1] = Succ INV−1 X,A (λ) − Pr Exp INV−2 * X,B (λ) = 1 ,
Proofs from Section 5

Proof of Theorem 1
Fix an efficient adversary A. Without loss of generality, we assume that each of A's queries to the signature oracle is preceeded by a query on the same message to random oracle H pub . We also assume that A doesn't make redundant queries (i.e. doesn't query multiple times the same message to H pub or to O Sign oracle; note that signature generation in 2 : 1−Sig is deterministic) and that A queries H pub (msg * ) before outputting forgery candidate (msg * , σ * ). We finally assume that the output distribution of random oracle H pub is the one induced by Sample B algorithm; see "Appendix 2" for the construction of such a random oracle.
The proof proceeds with a sequence of games. Game G 0 is the regular unforgeability game from Fig. 1 . Game G 1 is like G 0 except that in the specification of the O Sign oracle we replace PRF F by a random function ϕ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}; by a standard argument we obtain
for an efficient PRF distinguisher C.
Game G 2 is like G 1 except that we change the way random oracle H pub is implemented. Concretely, instead of assigning values H pub (msg) using the Sample B algorithm, we compute a msg ← R Sample A (pub, d) for d = ϕ(msg) and return b = Apply (pub, a msg ) . We obtain In Game G 2 , this new way of processing H pub queries allows us to accurately answer signature queries without requiring knowledge of td. Let (msg * , σ * ) denote a valid forgery in game G 2 . We then have Apply(pub, a msg * ) = Apply(pub, σ * ) (by the validity of the forgery) and, with probability (close to) 1/2, Decide(pub, a msg * ) = Decide (pub, σ * ) (as bit ϕ(msg * ) remains hidden from A). If this condition is met it allows the extraction of td from a msg * and σ * . Once td is known, winning the INV−2 game is trivial: Succ is close to uniformly distributed in J n / ±1 = Q R n / ±1 . A similar argument holds for the Q R n / ±1 sampler. (λ 2 ) = 1 .
Game 2.
In this game, we place an additional condition on the simulator to output 1, namely that the signature returned by the adversary must include an s value which was previously queried to H pub . However, since the s value for a subject is only known to the challenger before an O Sign query, no adversary should be able to construct a valid signature without querying O Sign .
would have been at most the probability of a uniform b i being guessed plus the probability of distinguishing the uniform distribution from Sample B 's distribution plus the probability of distinguishing 
